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INTRODUCTION

In 1974 Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)Y to regulate "the only large private accumulation of funds which [had] escaped the imprimatur of effective federal regulation"-employee benefit and pension funds.' Among the
1. Act of Sept. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 10011461 (1982).
2. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4639, 4641 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. At the time ERISA was reported to the
House of Representatives, it was estimated that private pension funds controlled in excess
of $150 billion. Later estimates substantially revised this figure. In 1975, it was estimated
that private pension funds controlled $211.5 billion. By 1980 this figure had increased to
$430.6 billion, and by 1985, it is estimated that in excess of $860 billion will be invested in
private pension funds. See Kaiser, Labor's New Weapon: Pension Fund Leverage-CanLabor Legally Beat Its Plowshares Into Swords?, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 409, 409 (1982). See also
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provisions of the Act was one imposing fiduciary obligations on any
person exercising any power of control, management, or disposition
over the assets of a fund.' Beneficiaries of an employee benefit
fund are authorized to enforce these fiduciary obligations through
civil actions in federal court. 4 Congress intended the courts to inPension Scoreboard: A Controversial Glow of Health, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 17, 1984, at 153.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1104. Section 402 of ERISA provides that "[e]very employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument. Such instrument shall provide for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or severally shall have
authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan." 29 U.S.C. §
1102(a)(1).
Section 404 of ERISA provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prudent man standard of care. (1) Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 1342, and
1344 of this title, a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so;
and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions
of this subchapter or subchapter III of this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). See HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4649, 4659.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1132. This section provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may be brought(1) by a participant or beneficiary(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan ...
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the
case of a violation of 1025(c) of this title;
(5) [B] to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii)
to enforce any provision of this subchapter[.]
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
Jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the federal courts, except that state courts may address refusals by fiduciaries to award benefits due under an employee benefit plan:
Jurisdiction. (1) Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, the
district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary. State courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of the United
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terpret the fiduciary obligations of ERISA and so to develop a federal common law under which the actions of these persons may be
judged.'
This comment will address the development of ERISA's fiduciary standards in light of the ten years of jurisprudence decided by
the federal courts since the passage of the Act. Pre-ERISA regulation of employee benefit and pension plans will be briefly examined to provide an historical perspective. An analysis of the extent of the fiduciary obligations will be undertaken in an effort to
define those persons upon whom the obligations devolve. Finally,
the scope of ERISA-imposed fiduciary obligations will be addressed in an attempt to define conduct permitted and proscribed
by the Act.
II.

PRE-ERISA REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT AND PENSION
PLANS-THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT

Prior to the enactment of ERISA there was no comprehensive
federal regulation of employee pension and benefit plans; such regulation as existed was enacted piecemeal and ultimately proved inadequate to the task.' It is in this predecessor legislation, however,
that one finds the roots of ERISA. One of the problems ERISA
was designed to redress-the absence of standards for plan structure and administration 7-had earlier been the subject of congresStates shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this
section. (2) Where an action under this subchapter is brought in a district court of
the United States, it may be brought in the district where the plan is administered,
where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or may be found, and
process may be served in any other district where a defendant resides or may be
found.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(e). The federal courts have jurisdiction without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties. Id. § 1132(f). Finally, the Act allows for the
recovery of reasonable attorney's fees by either party at the discretion of the court. Id. §
1132(g).
ERISA defines the term "participant" as a person "who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan," 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7), while a
"beneficiary" is defined as "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an
employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." Id. §
1002(8). For purposes of clarity, the terms shall be used interchangeably.
5. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4650. See also generally In re White Farm
Equip. Co., 42 Bankr. 1005, 1014-16 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (discussing necessity for federal
courts to fashion federal common law under ERISA).
6. See infra notes 14 & 17 and accompanying text.
7. The congressional findings and declaration of policy which introduce ERISA state
that
owing to the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning their
operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to

1036

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:1033

sional scrutiny. That scrutiny resulted in the enactment of the
Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.8 This Act contained language which was
later reenacted by ERISA,9 and the fiduciary standards developed
by case law decided under Taft-Hartley have found widespread acceptance and application in cases decided under ERISA.
The impetus for the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act is widely
attributed to the activities of John L. Lewis. As president of the
United Mine Workers of America, Lewis' "demand that mine operators create a welfare fund for the union by contributing 10 cents
for each ton of coal mined, caused the Congress to act." 10 Congressional concern focused on "the attempts of representatives of labor
to obtain payments from employers in excess of the salaries paid
their employees, and use [of] such payments in establishing funds
over which no one but the labor representatives would have any
control,"'" the concern being that "if welfare funds were estabprovide for the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be
made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and
administration of such [employee benefit and pension] plans ....
ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). See supra note 3.
8. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). This act is commonly referred to as the TaftHartley Act, after the names of its congressional sponsors. It will hereinafter be cited as
"Taft-Hartley Act" or "LMRA."
9. Compare LMRA § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (trust fund must be established
"for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees") with ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a) (fiduciary must act "solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries
and-(A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their benefi").
ciaries .
10. United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299, 304-05 (1956). See also Arroyo v. United
States, 359 U.S. 419, 426 (1959) ("Congressional attention was focussed particularly . . .
because of the demands which had then recently been made by a large international union
for the establishment of a welfare fund to be financed by employer's contributions and administered exclusively by union officials.").
An interesting commentary on the power wielded by Lewis during his heyday is found in
this observation by Judge Dumbauld:
John D. Rockefeller, founder of the Standard Oil Trust, won unique and lasting
fame in the annals of bargaining power by inducing railroads to accord him a rebate,
not only upon his own freight traffic, but upon that of other shippers (his competitors) as well. John L. Lewis, on behalf of the United Mine Workers of America, attained similar eminence by bargaining for the payment of royalty upon the mining of
coal owned by other parties. The term "royalty" had theretofore been deemed to
mean a payment to the owner of coal or other natural resources when exploited for
the market by others. The Lewis "royalty" was to be payable even by the owner
himself upon the mining of his own coal, and to a non-owner.
Gomez v. Lewis, 292 F. Supp. 560, 560-61 (W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir.
1964) (emphasis in original). See generally 92 CONG. REC. 4892-94, 4899, 5181, 5345-46
(describing Lewis' efforts to impose royalty on mined coal).
11. 92 CONG. REc. 4892-93 (remarks of Senator Byrd).

1985

ERISA

1037

lished which did not define with specificity the benefits payable
thereunder, a substantial danger existed that such funds might be
employed to perpetuate control of union officers, for political purposes, or even for personal gain."' 2 This concern resulted in the
passage of section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act, which forbids any
payments by an employer to a representative of his employees except for payments made to a bona fide trust fund established to
provide pensions and health and welfare benefits."3 Section 302
mandates that the detailed basis on which contributions to the
fund are made be specified in writing; that the fund be administered jointly by an equal number of employer- and employee-appointed trustees; that, in the event of a deadlock by the trustees on
fund administration, the dispute be submitted to an impartial arbitrator for resolution; and, finally, that contributions to the fund
be made "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees...
and their families and dependents .... "14It is from this lastquoted language that one current ERISA standard governing review of the actions of pension and benefit fund fiduciaries ultimately derives-the arbitrary and capricious standard.' 5
The arbitrary and capricious standard evolved in the context of
suits brought under Section 302 by beneficiaries of Taft-Hartley
trusts who were denied benefits by the trustees. The remarkable
aspect of this evolution is that the federal courts took state common law fiduciary standards" and fashioned a body of federal
12. Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 426 (1959).
13. LMRA § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).
14. Id. Cf. ERISA §§ 402, 404, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1104. It is important to note that the
Taft-Hartley Act is applicable only to trusts established by collective bargaining between
employers and unions, which are funded by employer contributions, and in which the union
retains some administrative authority. See Shapiro v. Rosenbaum, 171 F. Supp. 875
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). Trust funds in which the employer acts as the sole trustee, or funds unilaterally established by unions, are outside the scope of the statute. All three types of funds,
however, are within the scope of ERISA. See ERISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
15. See, e.g., Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Plan, 740 F.2d 454, 457 (6th
Cir. 1984); UMWA v. Allied Corp., 735 F.2d 121, 133 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2728 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Allen v. UMWA 1979 Benefit Plan &
Trust, 726 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1984); Sharron v. Amalgamated Ins. Agency Serv., Inc.,
704 F.2d 562, 564 (11th Cir. 1983); Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension
& Retirement Fund, 698 F.2d 593, 599 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 105 (1984);
Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1982); Maggard v.
O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Adams v. New Jersey Brewery Employees,
Pension Trust Fund, 670 F.2d 387, 398 (3d Cir. 1982); Palino v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854, 858
(1st Cir. 1981); Peckham v. Board of Trustees of the Int'l Bhd. of Painters and Allied
Trades Union, 653 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir. 1981); Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371
(9th Cir. 1977). See infra notes 51-102 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 427 (1959) ("The legislative his-
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common law peculiar to Taft-Hartley trusts, without apparent jurisdiction or authority to do so. 17 The theory employed by the
tory is devoid of any suggestion that defalcating trustees were to be held accountable under
can be assumed that [the trustee] offended local criminal law."); Valle
federal law. . . [I]t
v. Joint Plumbing Indus. Bd., 623 F.2d 196, 203 n.15 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Even if the claims of
arbitrary and capricious application of the amendments [to the pension trust fund] do not
independently support federal jurisdiction, exercise of pendent jurisdiction is proper to decide these claims under state law."); Bricklayers Int'l Union Local 15 v. Stuart Plastering
Co., 512 F.2d 1017, 1026 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The existence of a trust fund that meets the
requirements of applicable state law is a prerequisite to lawful employer payments to a trust
fund.
...
). See also Welch & Wilson, Applicability of Traditional Principles of Trust
Law to Union and Management Representatives Administering Taft-Hartley Trusts, 23
L A. L.J. 671, 675 (1972) ("it seems to have been assumed by everyone that traditional trust
principles would apply" to Taft-Hartley trusts). But cf. Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362,
1368 (9th Cir. 1976) (state trust rules "incompatible with federal policy.").
17. In UMWA Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562 (1982), the Supreme Court stated that:
In NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., [453 U.S. 322 (1981)] at 330, the Court held that in
enacting § 302(c)(5) "Congress intended to impose on trustees traditional fiduciary
duties." The Court did not decide, nor do we decide today, whether federal courts
sitting as courts of equity are authorized to enforce those duties.
Id. at 573 n.12. Prior to the decision in Robinson, courts had struggled with the problem of
whether § 302 conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce the fiduciary duties
attendant to the administration of Taft-Hartley trusts. See, e.g., Local Union No. 5, Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Mahoning and Trumbull County Bldg. Trades Welfare Fund,
541 F.2d 636, 638 (6th Cir. 1976) ("assuming" that district court had jurisdiction); Alvares v.
Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 164 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975) ("unclear" whether
district court had jurisdiction); Beam v. International Org. of Masters, Mates and Pilots, 511
F.2d 975, 979 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Perhaps Congress should have gone further setting special
standards of review for these trustees, but this is not a determination to be made by this
court today."). Some decided that § 302 conferred no jurisdiction on the federal courts to
review the trustees' administration of a trust fund. E.g., Haley v. Palatnik, 378 F. Supp. 499
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 509 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1975), where the court
stated:
We think the weight of reason and authority supports the view that § 302 is not a
congressional mandate to the federal courts to create federal law governing the administration of trusts funds. Therefore, we conclude, as has the majority of courts
which has considered the issue, that § 302 of the Act does not prohibit breaches of
fiduciary duty, diversion of trust funds, or similar allegations which relate solely to
the maladministration of trust funds.
378 F. Supp. at 505 (footnotes omitted) (citing Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421,
426 (1st Cir. 1968); Fiorelli v. Kelewer, 339 F. Supp. 796, 799 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Holton v.
McFarland, 215 F. Supp. 372 (D. Alaska 1963); Kane v. Shulton, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 882, 884
(D.N.J. 1960); Sanders v. Birthright, 172 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Ind. 1959); Moses v. Ammond,
162 F. Supp. 866, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)). See also HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4642 ("The
Labor Management Relations Act, Sec. 302, provides the fundamental guidelines for the
establishment and operation of pension funds administered jointly by an employer and a
union. The Act is not intended to establish nor does it provide standards for the preservation of vested benefits, funding adequacy, security of investment, or fiduciary conduct.").
Other courts determined that federal jurisdiction extended to review of trustees' actions
allegedly violative of their fiduciary duties. The leading case is Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345
(D.C. Cir. 1962), in which the court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard because it
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courts in developing the arbitrary and capricious standard utilized
a bootstrap approach to assert jurisdiction over the trustees' alleged malfeasance: because section 302 requires that a trust fund
be established "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees,"' 8 the administration of such a fund is subject to judicial scrutiny to determine whether in fact the trust satisfies the statutory
standard-the so-called "structural violation" analysis.' 9 This
analysis began with the premise that a provision of a plan which
has the effect of denying beneficiaries their right to benefits under
the plan, with no reasonable purpose for so doing, is not established "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees." 0 Once
was "conceded by the Trustees that their decision as to [plaintiff's eligibility for a pension]
is subject to judicial review to determine 'whether the Trustees have acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith ..
' " Id. at 348. See also Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (applying Danti standard); Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d
744 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964) (same). Other courts seized upon the
Danti line of cases as precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction over trust fund administration. See, e.g., Beam v. International Org. of Masters, Mates and Pilots, 511 F.2d 975 (2d
Cir. 1975); Gomez v. Lewis, 414 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1969); Connell v. United States Steel
Corp., 371 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1975); Hayes v. Morse,
347 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Mo. 1972), a/I'd, 474 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1973); Patterson v. UMWA
Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950, 346 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Dersch v. UMWA
Welfare and Retirement Fund, 309 F. Supp. 395 (S.D. Ind. 1969). In fact, one court observed that "the federal courts in deciding Danti and the cases following it were not merely
applying the general common law of the state as an exercise of their diversity jurisdiction.
Rather they were pronouncing a rule of federal labor law applicable in all similar cases."
Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1976).
As noted, the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of the federal courts' jurisdiction
to review trustees' actions under § 302, Robinson, 455 U.S. at 573 n.12, nor is it likely to:
"ERISA essentially codified the strict fiduciary standards that a § 302(c)(5) trustee must
meet." NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 332 (1981). Thus an independent ground for
the exercise of federal jurisdiction now exists. See supra note 4.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1976). See supra note 9.
19. See, e.g., Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ill. 1971) where the court stated:
The case law appears to be settled, and the defendants agree, that this Court has
jurisdiction to review all allegations regarding a union pension fund that relate to
structural violations, by which term is meant violations of the statutory requirements
enumerated in Section 302(c)(5), although we have no jurisdiction to inquire into
mere violations of fiduciary obligations or standards of prudence in the ordinary administration of the trust fund. [Citations omitted]. We must, therefore, determine if
plaintiffs' claims involve the structural requirements of Section 302(c)(5).
The defendants categorize plaintiffs' suit as one merely involving the interpretation
and application of the Pension Plan adopted by the defendant-trustees. A careful
reading of the complaint, however, indicates that the plaintiff specifically alleges that
the break-in-service provision of the Pension Plan, which in effect divested him of the
contributions made by his employers on his behalf, renders the Plan violative of Section 302(c)(5) because the Plan as thus structured is not one for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees . ...
Id. at 1231-32.
20. Id. at 1233. See also Music v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust
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an initial determination is made that the plan as structured has
such an effect, the court then had jurisdiction to review the trustees' actions in denying benefits, utilizing the arbitrary and capricious standard.2" It thus became a relatively simple matter for a
plaintiff to obtain federal jurisdiction over his claim of wrongful
denial of benefits by asserting only that he was a participant in the
plan and was denied benefits, these assertions being sufficient to
make out a prima facie case of "structural defect" in the plan itself.12 Despite the dubious foundation for the exercise of federal
Fund, 712 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1983) (trustees who act arbitrarily and capriciously fail to
satisfy the "sole and exclusive benefit" requirement of § 302(c)(5)); Hum v. Retirement
Fund of the Plumbing, Heating and Piping Indus., 703 F.2d 386, 390 (9th Cir. 1983) ("structural defect test is not limited to group violations"); Lugo v. Employees Retirement Fund of
the Illumination Prod. Indus., 529 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Plaintiff argues that a trust
fund authorizing the trustees to act arbitrarily and capriciously in determining claims without extending certain procedural protections fails to satisfy the 'sole and exclusive benefit'
requirement of section 302(c)(5)."); U.S. Dep't of Labor, ERISA Op. Letter No. 82-1A, Jan.
5, 1983 at 2-3:
The majority of the courts have drawn a distinction between "structural deficiencies"-which may be remedied under § 302(c)(5)-and "day-to-day administration of
funds"-which may not be challenged under § 302(c)(5). The case law subsequently
developed that a court could set aside a trustee's decision with respect to a substantive provision of a plan document if it were persuaded that the trustee had acted
"arbitrarily and capriciously," on the theory that arbitrary and capricious conduct is
not for the "sole and exclusive benefit" of employees and is, therefore, "structurally
deficient."
Id.
21. See, e.g., Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. at 1234:
We believe that this standard of review is appropriate at least so far as the trustees'
actions in establishing the terms of the trust are concerned as distinguished from
their day to day administration of it. It seems obvious, for example, that arbitrary
and capricious eligibility provisions might be violative of the structural requirement
that the trust be for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees. This standard of
review would, on the one hand, prevent the federal courts from becoming reviewing
bodies for every routine action taken or regulation promulgated by the trustees of a
Section 302 trust, yet would aid in insuring the basic structural integrity of such
trusts.
In this connection, it should be noted that alleged fraud, misconduct, breach of
fiduciary duty, etc. by trustees of a Section 302 trust may be litigated by the interested party or parties in the state courts just as similar alleged conduct by trustees of
other trusts, however created, may be challenged or reviewed. The question of
whether the provisions of a Section 302 trust meet the statutory standards or whether
the trustees have arbitrarily and capriciously limited participation in the benefits of
the trust, however, would appear to be litigable only in the Federal courts.
Id.
22. See id. at 1233:
Because the plaintiff has alleged and has put into controversy an exclusionary eligibility requirement concerning the defendants' § 302 trust, we cannot at this stage of
the proceedings conclusively state that plaintiff will . . . be incapable of proving facts
which will demonstrate that the Pension Plan here involved is not for the sole and
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jurisdiction, the arbitrary and capricious standard, developed by
the cases interpreting it under section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
has been expressly adopted as the governing ERISA standard. 3
III.

WHO

Is

A FIDUCIARY?

The arbitrary and capricious standard governs the conduct of
pension and benefit fund fiduciaries. ERISA imposes fiduciary status beyond that recognized at common law, 24 and imposes, in secexclusive benefit of employees.
Id. See also Hum v. Retirement Fund Trust of the Plumbing, Heating and Piping Indus.,
703 F.2d 386, 390 (9th Cir. 1983) (structural defect test "extends to rules that arbitrarily
exclude individual employees from their chance at benefits").
23. See, e.g., UMWA v. Allied Corp., 735 F.2d 121, 133 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2728 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Fine v. Semet, 699 F.2d 1091,
1093 (11th Cir. 1983); Elser v. IAM Nat'l Pension Fund, 684 F.2d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 67 (1983); Peckham v. Board of Trustees of the Int'l Bhd. of Painters
& Allied Trades Union, 653 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir. 1981); Robinson v. UMWA Health and
Retirement Funds, 640 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 562
(1982); Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 637 F.2d 592, 596 & n.5 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981); Pierce v. NECA-IBEW Welfare Trust Fund, 620 F.2d 589,
591 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), aff'g 488 F. Supp. 559, 564 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1015 (1980); Bayles v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund,
602 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1979); Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1978);
Rueda v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 576 F.2d 939, 942 (1st Cir. 1978); Bueneman v. Central
States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 & n.3 (8th Cir.
1978); Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570 F.2d 406, 413 (2d Cir. 1977).
24. The HousE REPORT, supra note 2, reveals the following congressional observations
and concerns:
[A] number of plans are structured in such a way that it is unclear whether the traditional law of trusts is applicable. Predominantly, these are plans, such as insured
plans, which do not use the trust form as their mode of funding. Administrators and
others exercising control functions in such plans . . . are subject only to minimal
restrictions and the applicability of present State law to employee benefit plans is
sometimes unclear. Second, even where the funding mechanism of the plan is in the
form of a trust, reliance on conventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately
protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. This is because trust law
had developed in the context of testamentary and inter vivos trusts (usually designed
to pass designated property to an individual or small group of persons) with attendant emphasis on carrying out the instructions of the settlor. Thus, if the settlor
incldes [sic] in the trust document an exculpatory clause under which the trustee is
relieved from liability for certain actions which would otherwise constitute a breach
of duty, or if the settler [sic] specifies that the trustee shall be allowed to make investments which might otherwise be considered imprudent, the trust law in many
states will be interpreted to allow the deviation. In the absence of a fiduciary responsibility section in the present act, courts applying trust law to employee benefit plans
have allowed the same kinds of deviations, even though the typical employee benefit
plan, covering hundreds or even thousands of participants, is quite different from the
testamentary trust both in purpose and in nattire.
Id. at 4650. See also S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4838, 4847; Little & Thrailkill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A Narrow Path to
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tion 3(21)(A), fiduciary obligations not only on the trustees, but
upon any person
to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary
control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders
investment advice for a fee or other cofnpensation, direct or indirect, with
respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority
or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan."'

"It is clear that Congress intended the definition of 'fiduciary'
under ERISA to be broadly construed . . . . Thus, 'fiduciary'
should be defined not only by reference to particular titles, such as
'trustee', but also by considering the authority which a particular
2' 6
person has or exercises over an employee benefit plan.
This broad definition has ensnared some traditionally exempt
parties in the net of fiduciary obligations. In Eaves v. Penn,27 an
officer and director of a corporation was found to be a fiduciary
where he recommended, designed, and implemented an amendment to an existing profit sharing plan, converting it to an employee stock ownership plan. 28 After the conversion, defendant
Penn became holder of legal title to all the corporation's stock, and
proceeded to appoint himself chairman of the board, vice president
and treasurer of the corporation. He also began to systematically
loot the company. 29 The beneficiaries under the former profit sharing plan brought suit alleging that Penn breached his fiduciary duTread, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1977).

25. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1982). See supra note 3.
26. Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1984). The court prefaced its discussion of the defendant's fiduciary status with the following syllogism: "If it Talks Like a
Duck ... and Walks Like a Duck ... It is a Duck." Id. at 308-09. See also, e.g., Monson v.

Century Mfg. Co., 739 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1984) (person who worked on amendments
to profit sharing plan, was responsible for informing employees about the plan, discussed
contributions to plan with independent accountant, and consulted on plan investments held
to be a fiduciary); Margaret Hall Found., Inc. v. Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 572 F.
Supp. 1475 (D. Mass. 1983) (person is fiduciary to extent he exercises discretion over assets
of plan); Shaw v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Pension Plan,
563 F. Supp. 653 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (union officials who were trustees and administrators of
pension plan were fiduciaries); Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390 (S.D. Ala. 1982)
(counsel for plan liable as fiduciary to the extent he was personally enriched from its assets);
Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
27. 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978).
28. Id. at 458. An employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is a type of benefit plan in
which employees collectively own all of the stock in the employer company. See 29 U.S.C. §
1107(d)(6); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1458 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussing
origins of ESOP concept).
29. 587 F.2d at 456-59.
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ties to them and the court agreed, noting that under ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) Penn was a fiduciary because he received "indirect
compensation for his investment advice," namely, control of the
corporation."
Similarly, in Peoria Union Stockyards Co. v. Penn Mutual Life
Insurance Co.,"' suit was brought by a pension plan and its trustees and beneficiaries against an insurer with whom the plaintiffs
had a group annuity contract, alleging that the insurer was a fiduciary of the plan and that it had breached its fiduciary obligations.
The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Penn Mutual was not a fiduciary, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Under the contract, Penn Mutual calculated the amount
of annual contributions by Peoria Union necessary to purchase an32
nuities upon retirement for each of Peoria Union's employees.
These contributions were deposited with Penn Mutual, which invested them in a single account, -commingled for investment purposes with the accounts of other customers of the insurance company in order to obtain diversification while minimizing the costs
of investment for the individual contributors.3 3 Then, upon the retirement of a Peoria Union employee, Penn Mutual would inform
the employer of the amount required to purchase an annuity for
that employee. Peoria Union would either purchase the annuity directly from Penn Mutual, with the purchase price deducted from
its account, or withdraw the funds and purchase from another provider.3 4 The contract further provided that Peoria Union could terminate the contract and recover all moneys on deposit with Penn
Mutual, but that such moneys would be repaid in full over a five
year period, subject to Penn Mutual's crediting the account with
interest at the rate of three percent per year; if Peoria Union demanded immediate repayment, the amount immediately forthcoming would be reduced to the present value of the total moneys on
deposit." After a dispute arose between Peoria Union and Penn
Mutual regarding Penn Mutual's internal accounting practices and
their effect on Peoria Union's account, Peoria Union exercised its
right of termination and demanded immediate repayment of its ac30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 459.
698 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 322.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 323.
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count." Penn Mutual responded that immediate repayment of the
full $756,000 on deposit would reduce that amount to $537,000." 7
Peoria Union then filed suit alleging violations of ERISA and federal securities laws.
The Seventh Circuit, in discussing the counts brought under
ERISA, noted that:
Congress did not want to make an insurance company that sells a standard
annuity contract-one that provides "benefits the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer"-a fiduciary toward the purchaser of the contract.
But that is not what Penn Mutual sold here. The pension trustees did not
buy an insurance contract with a fixed payout; they turned over the assets
of the pension plan to Penn Mutual to manage with full investment discretion, subject only to a modest investment guaranty. If the pension plan had
hired an investment advisor and given him authority to buy and sell securities at his discretion for the plan's account, the advisor would be a fiduciary
within the meaning of the act, and that is essentially what the trustees did
during the . . . contract with Penn Mutual.3 8

The court also found that "the provision [of the contract] allowing
Penn Mutual to have use of these funds for five years at below
market interest rates was a form of compensation to Penn Mutual"
and so might subject them to fiduciary obligations under ERISA
section 3(21)(A)(ii).3 9 The court remanded the case for trial.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 327 (citing ERISA § 401(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2)(B)).
39. Id. at 326. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. See also Chicago Bd. of
Options Exchange v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 254, 260 (7th Cir. 1983) (insurance carrier's contractual authority to amend rates of return in pension plan annuity
contracts "carried with it the status of ERISA fiduciary"); Lentino v. Fringe Employee
Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1979) (attorney for plan who advised trustees to make
payments in violation of trust agreement held to be fiduciary); McLaughlin v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (insurer with authority to grant or
deny claims found to be fiduciary). Cf. Schulist v. Blue Cross, 717 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1983)
(insurer with no control over choice of coverage chosen by plan and which submitted low bid
for such coverage found not to be fiduciary, despite retaining $349,000 of excess premiums).
See generally Little & Thrailkill, supra note 24, where the authors note:
Because the definition [of fiduciary in section 3(21)(a)] includes those who render
investment advice for a fee, the following persons may be considered fiduciaries: insurance salesmen who recommend the purchase of certain types of insurance and receive a commission on the sale of such insurance; attorneys who counsel the employer, investment committee, or trustee with regard to an appropriate investment
portfolio mix or with regard to specific investments, and receive a fee for such services; or an actuary. An actuary or pension consultant also may be included in the
definition if he renders similar advice concerning plan management or asset investment for a fee. Finally, the term may include stockbrokers or dealers who recommend
certain securities and then participate in the acquisition or disposition of securities
and receive a commission for their services.
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It is important to distinguish the conduct found to give rise to
fiduciary status in the foregoing cases under ERISA section
3(21)(A) from the fiduciary status of "named fiduciaries" defined
in section 402(a). The former are fiduciaries only "to the extent"
that they engage in the type of activity described in section
3(21)(A), while the latter group of "named fiduciaries" are fiduciaries for all purposes under the Act.4 0
The distinction was examined in Brandt v. Grounds.4 1 In
Brandt, the plaintiffs sued defendant Grounds, a former trustee of
a profit sharing plan, and a bank where the plan deposited its
funds, seeking to recover $175,000 allegedly converted by Grounds.
The plaintiffs sought to hold the bank liable under the provisions
of ERISA section 3(21)(A) because it had provided investment advice to the plan for a fee, and it had exercised significant control
over the plan's assets by paying out the money to Grounds over a
forged endorsement. 2 The district court dismissed the ERISA
count on the basis that if the bank was a fiduciary at all, it was so
only "to the extent" that it rendered investment advice, and thus
ERISA's fiduciary obligations did not extend to its role as a depository institution. 4 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting
that there [was] no allegation that the bank was a "named fiduciary" as
defined in 29 U.S.C. §1102(a)(2). Therefore, assuming that the Bank became
a fiduciary by providing investment advice, its fiduciary status existed only
"to the extent" that it provided that advice, 29 U.S.C. §1002(21)(A). As
noted by the District Judge, the phrase "to the extent" obviously suggests a
limitation of the fiduciary responsibility.
Thus it appears that the personal liability of the bank would be limited to
its violation of 29 U.S.C. §1104 in performing its investment advising
functions."

The court concluded that "without a causal connection between
the [investment] advice and the loss, no liability can exist . .. .- 5
The standard of review which emerges from a study of the case
Id. at 4-5.
40. Compare ERISA § 3(21)(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(a), with ERISA § 402(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1102(a) (named fiduciary "shall have authority to control and manage operation
and administration of the plan."), and ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (setting forth fiduciary
duties). See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-3 (1984) ("a plan administrator or trustee of a plan
must, by the very nature of his position, have 'discretionary authority ....

hold such positions will therefore be fiduciaries.").
41. 687 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1982).
42. Id. at 896.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 897.
45. Id. at 898. See also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1984).
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law reveals that courts will strictly scrutinize the activities of those
alleged to be fiduciaries:
To determine whether [a party] is an ERISA fiduciary, the court must examine whether [the party] had discretionary duties, since those duties are
within the coverage of the statute while purely ministerial functions are not.
Further, the court must make some attempt to ascertain the type of activity
Congress sought to protect under the Act."

Department of Labor regulations make it clear that "[o]nly persons who perform one or more of the functions described in section
3(21)(A) of the Act with respect to an employee benefit plan are
fiduciaries. ' 47 Nevertheless, a person or organization such as an insurance company or broker, attorney, or a securities dealer may
unwittingly find itself subject to ERISA fiduciary standards if it
retains any discretion in its dealings with an employee benefit or
pension plan or if it renders investment advice for a fee;' 8 fiduciary
status is not dependent upon the intent of the party to act as a
fiduciary. 9 It thus behooves anyone dealing with an employee benefit or pension plan in a non-fiduciary capacity to eliminate all discretionary authority over the plan's assets, or else to cover any po50
tential liability by purchasing fiduciary insurance.
46. Robbins v. First American Bank, 514 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (N.D. Il. 1981).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, at D-2. But see Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1078 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("But, even though plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against these defendants
as fiduciaries within the meaning of ERISA, they may still have stated a claim under ERISA
on the theory that the defendants conspired with parties who are fiduciaries to breach the
duties imposed by ERISA.") (emphasis in original).
48. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 635 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
50. ERISA's liability provisions are found at §§ 405 and 409, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1105, 1109.
Section 409 provides in pertinent part that fiduciaries of a plan "shall be personally liable to
make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to
restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through the use of
assets of the plan by the fiduciary .... 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
Section 405 provides in part that a fiduciary
shall be liable for a breach of fiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary ...
1). if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act
or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach;
2). if by his failure to comply with section 1104(a)(1) in the administration of
his specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as fiduciary, he has
enabled such other fiduciary to commit a breach; or
3). if he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes
reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy the breach.
Id. § 1105(a).
Section 410, while forbidding exculpatory provisions purporting to relieve fiduciaries of
their obligations under the Act, does permit the plan and/or fiduciary to purchase insurance
covering liability or losses caused by breaches of fiduciary duty. The insurance must permit
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APPLICATION OF THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD

Once it is determined that an individual falls within ERISA's
definition of a fiduciary, his actions, if challenged, become subject
to judicial review to determine if they are arbitrary or capricious."'
The standard is an articulation of the duty of loyalty imposed on
trustees by both ERISA and the common law.5 2 The Third Circuit
has observed that "[a]lIthough the courts have described the applicability of the arbitrary and capricious standard in rather overbroad language, they nonetheless have limited the use of the standard to cases involving personal claims for benefits."53 This
limitation is not surprising in light of the standard's origins in
cases decided under section 302(c)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act."
"'The concept of "arbitrary and capricious" review defies generalized application' and must be contextually tailored."55 In the
context of review of trustees' decisions under ERISA, courts have
articulated several considerations. "Factors relevant to whether
trustees of a pension plan acted arbitrarily and capriciously include: 1) uniformity of construction of the plan; 2) interpretation
recourse by the insurer against the fiduciary. Id. § 1110.
51. See supra note 15 (collecting cases).
52. See, e.g., Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d
325, 333 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Section 1104 of ERISA imposes a . . . duty of loyalty, and not
surprisingly the courts have applied the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard ....
"). See
also Evans v. Bexley, 750 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 123
(7th Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464 (5th Cir. 1983). See generally
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 324, 329 (1981) ("a trustee bears an unwavering duty of
complete loyalty to the beneficiary of the trust, to the exclusion of the interests of all other
parties").
53. Struble, 732 F.2d at 333 (citing Elser v. IAM Nat'l Pension Fund, 684 F.2d 648
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 67 (1983); Palino v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854 (1st Cir.
1981); Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 680 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1039 (1982)). See also Davidson v. Cook, 567 F. Supp. 225, 239 (E.D. Va. 1983).
In contrast to cases decided under ERISA's duty of loyalty are those decided under the
duty of care prescribed by ERISA's "prudent man" language, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). See,
e.g., Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Cody v. Donovan,
105 S.Ct. 565 (1985) ("The court's task is to inquire 'whether the individual trustees at the
time they engaged in the challenged transactions, employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the investment.' ") (quoting Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 704 (1984));
Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983) ("courts have focused the
inquiry under the 'prudent man' rule on a review of the fiduciary's independent investigation of the merits of a particular investment"); Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982) (violation for trustee to cause plan to purchase additional
corporate stock at inflated price during hostile tender offer). See supra note 3.
54. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
55. Maggard v. O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
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of the plan contrary to its terms; 3) fair interpretation; and 4) unanticipated costs. 56 To this list should also be added a fifth consideration: administration of the plan in a manner violative of the
law.5 7 These considerations will be briefly discussed in turn.
A.

Uniformity of Construction of the Plan

The requirement that the pension or benefit plan be uniformly
construed is necessary to assure that similarly situated participants
will be treated in a like manner. Perhaps the best evidence of arbitrary or capricious action by trustees would be the granting of benefits to one participant while denying them to another in the same
or similar circumstances. Thus, it is not surprising that few cases
58
have been decided on the basis of a violation of this requirement.
Consistent construction has, however, been used by the courts as
evidence that the trustees did not breach their fiduciary
5 9
obligations.
56. Carr. v. Trustees of the Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Pension Fund,
585 F. Supp. 949, 952 (E.D. Pa. 1984). See also, e.g., Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681
F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982), where the court stated:
[W]e also view as probative of the good faith of a trustee or administrator the following factors: (1) internal consistency of a plan under the interpretation given by the
administrators or trustees; (2) any relevant regulations formulated by the appropriate
administrative agencies, here the IRS and Department of Labor; and (3) factual background of the determination by a plan and inferences of a lack of good faith, if any.
Id.
57. See, e.g., Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Due to
the serious violations of ERISA by Del Monte, we find that its general administration of the
[Plan] and its particular decision to deny. . . benefits to plaintiffs . . . were arbitrary and
capricious.").
58. But see Frary v. Shorr Paper Prod., Inc., 494 F. Supp. 565, 569 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(fact that participant was denied lump sum payment from Plan when he left employer to
work for competitor found to be arbitrary and capricious where other participants were
granted such payments; denial of benefits does not "serve an interest of the Plan's participants or beneficiaries."); Winpisinger v. Aurora Corp., Precision Castings Div., 456 F. Supp.
559, 568 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (violation to favor one class of beneficiaries over another). Cf.
infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 654 F.2d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 1981)
("The Plan has been consistently interpreted so as to suspend benefits to Plan members
working for employers contributing to the Plan. . . . This is a reasonable interpretation and
cannot be considered as either arbitrary or capricious."); Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan for
Employees of Howard B. Wolf, Inc., 637 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir. 1981) (no violation where
trustee "treated all similarly situated persons the same"); Bayles v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The evidence
conclusively established that the trustees have uniformly construed any work as a truck
driver as employment in the teamster industry and have granted service credits or suspended benefits based on that construction. Appellant was not treated differently from any
of the other 238 . . . truck drivers.
...).
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In other circumstances, inconsistent construction and application of Plan provisions have been excused where the trustees offered a rational justification. Thus, in Morse v. Stanley,0 the
plaintiffs, who had gone to work for a competitor, claimed that the
refusal of their former employer's pension plan trustees to award
them lump sum benefits from the retirement plan was a breach of
the trustees' fiduciary obligations because "the Trustees had by
their prior conduct established a practice of making distributions
to all terminated Plan participants without regard either to the
amount of the participant's account balance or the nature of his
subsequent employment."6 The court dismissed this argument,
noting that
[w]hether the Trustees had in the past granted acceleration [of benefit payments] to employees who requested it does not mean that they had donned
a discretionary strait-jacket which held them bound to grant acceleration in
all cases as a matter of course. On the contrary, the Plan gave them broad
discretion to evaluate requests for accelerated distribution on a case by case
basis.6"

The trustees' expressed reason for denying the lump sum payment
was "to encourage . . .employees to remain

. .,

rather than ac-

cept competitive employment and obtain a cash windfall in the
form of a lump-sum award from the. . . Plan,' ' 3 and, because the
plaintiffs would still be entitled to receive their benefits upon attainment of age 65, the "contention that the Trustees acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in denying them accelerated distributions
[was] without merit.""
The decision in Morse is an admirable example of the limited
scope of judicial review of trustee actions under the arbitrary and
capricious standard. "[T]his standard . . ., which leads neither to

abdication of traditional judicial control of fiduciaries nor to excessive judicial intervention in trust operations, [is] in harmony with
federal labor policy. '6 5 The courts have no experience in adminis60. 732 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1984).
61. Id. at 1144.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. See also Fine v. Semet, 699 F.2d 1091, 1094 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Such payments
[to other terminated employees] do not mandate a conclusion that a future [trustee committee] could not exercise the discretion vested in it by the plans to refuse a request for a lump
sum payment if it determined that granting the request would be fiscally unwise.").
65. Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Ganze v. Dart
Indus., Inc., 741 F.2d 790, 793 (5th Cir. 1984); Morse, 732 F.2d at 1145; Rosen v. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Union, 637 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981).
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tering employee benefit plans, and are therefore content to defer to
the decision of the trustees when that decision is supported by the
evidence or by rational explanation."6
B.

Interpretationof the Plan Contrary to Its Terms

"Federal courts have applied the arbitrary and capricious standard both to ambiguous and unambiguous terms. A rational and
reasonable interpretation of a plan may still be arbitrary and capricious if contrary to the plain meaning of the plan. '67 The "plain
meaning" requirement derives from section 304(a)(1)(D) of
ERISA, which requires fiduciaries to discharge their duties "in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
. ...,, Thus, "[w]hen the trustee's interpretation of a plan is in
direct conflict with express language in a plan, this action is a very
strong indication of arbitrary and capricious behavior."6 9
Easy decisions under this factor are those where the fiduciary
has clearly ignored or violated an unambiguous provision of a
plan.7 0 Harder cases arise where the terms of the plan are ambigu66. See, e.g., Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement
Fund Employee Pension Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 599 (2d Cir. 1983) ("We have stated
that the lawful, discretionary acts of a pension committee should not be disturbed, absent a
showing of bad faith or arbitrariness."); Peckham v. Board of Trustees of the Int'l Bhd. of
Painters & Allied Trades Union Nat'l Pension Fund, 653 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir. 1981)
(trustees' decision "must be considered final unless (1) arbitrary or capricious, (2) not supported by substantial evidence, or (3) erroneous on a question of law"); Horn v. Mullins, 650
F.2d 35, 37 (4th Cir. 1981) (decision must be upheld if supported "by substantial evidence");
Wardle v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 824
(7th Cir. 1980) (same); Vaughan v. Metal Lathers Local 46 Pension Fund, 474 F. Supp. 613,
617 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("It is sufficient that the Trustees' requirements have a rational justification."), afi'd, 626 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam). Cf. Roark v. Boyle, 439 F.2d 497,
499 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (in applying arbitrary and capricious standard under § 302(c)(5) of
LMRA, courts should be careful "to avoid second guessing the discretionary judgments of
the Trustees .... ").
67. Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). See supra note 3.
69. Dennard, 681 F.2d at 314.
70. See, e.g., Monson v. Century Mfg. Co., 739 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1984)
("Where, as here, the method of calculating profits is irregular and inconsistent with a common-sense reading of the definition contained in the [profit sharing] plan itself," the employer-trustee breaches his duty.); Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir. 1981)
("We conclude the Trustees acted arbitrarily and capriciously in interpreting [the Plan] in a
way which is inconsistent with the plain words of the document and which renders some
requirements superfluous." (footnote omitted)); Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266, 1273
(7th Cir. 1978) (trustees' decision "inherently inconsistent" with terms of plan); Viggiano v.
Shenango China Div. of Anchor Hocking Corp., 574 F. Supp. 861, 867 (W.D. Pa. 1983)
("Shenango's actions were not only contrary to the specific terms of the Plan, but were also
not solely in the interest of the plan participants nor for their exclusive benefit .... ").
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ous, and the fiduciary's decision is challenged as contrary to those
terms. Faced with this situation, the courts will attempt to discover the meaning of the ambiguous provision by reference to the
other provisions of the plan; an interpretation which is inconsis71
tent with or which renders superfluous another provision will fail.
The decision reached by the fiduciary need not be the "correct"
one as determined by the reviewing court; it need only be rationally based to avoid being arbitrary or capricious.7 2 Finally, uniformity of application of a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous
language will enhance the validity of the fiduciary's interpretation. 7 Thus, no amount of rationalizing can forgive a fiduciary's
actions taken in direct contravention of the plain meaning of the
plan. But a rational interpretation of ambiguous language will gen74
erally be upheld.
C.

Fair and Reasonable Interpretation

There occasionally arise circumstances where the trustees take
action within their discretion and authorized by the plain language
of the plan, but which is nevertheless determined to be a breach of
their fiduciary obligations. Two such circumstances have been
identified in the cases: 1) where trustees granted broad discretion71. See, e.g., Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1982);
Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1324 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1981).
72. See, e.g., Griffis v. Delta Family-Care Disability & Survivorship Plan, 723 F.2d
822, 825 (11th Cir. 1984) (the "interpretation of the intent or meaning of the provisions...
need not be the best possible decision, only one with a rational justification"); Dennard,681
F.2d at 314 ("The fact that a trustee's interpretation is not the correct one as determined by
a District Court does not establish in itself arbitrary and capricious action, but is a factor in
that determination.").
73. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text. See also Dennard,681 F.2d at 315:
The District Court appears to have put emphasis on the issue of uniformity in application, a factor probably not as important in a case claiming that the administrator or
trustees interpreted the plan contrary to its plain meaning as in a case of ambiguous
interpretation or operational problems outside the plan's language. While it is true
that differentiated treatment could be indicative of arbitrary and capricious action,
the opposite proposition, that uniformity establishes the absence of arbitrary and capricious conduct, is not necessarily true.
Id. But see Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d at 1324 n.4:
The Trustees argue that they have consistently interpreted [the Plan] to preclude the
award [of pension credits after disability]. They state a reasonable interpretation consistently applied is to be accorded substantial if not controlling weight in interpreting
the purpose and meaning of the trust document. . . . However, if the interpretation
is unreasonable from the beginning, such an interpretation may still be arbitrary and
capricious.
Id.
74. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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ary authority refuse to exercise that discretion to avoid an unjust
result; and 2) where in exercising their broad discretion, trustees
violate the principles of fundamental fairness.
The first circumstance is exemplified by the decision in Shishido
v. SIU-Pacific District-PMA Pension Plan.75 Mr. Shishido began
working as a merchant seaman in 1940, accepted perilous duty in
World War II trans-Atlantic convoys, and was decorated for bravery after the war by President Truman. 7 Despite this documented
courage and patriotism, Mr. Shishido's Merchant Mariner's Documents were revoked in 1951 pursuant to a Presidential Order
which forbade persons affiliated with subversive groups from serving in the United States' merchant fleet; Mr. Shishido was alleged
to be such a person, and was unable to secure employment. 77 In
1956, the Ninth Circuit determined that the screening of licenses
was unconstitutional, and Mr. Shishido was once again eligible to
serve on-board ship.7 8 Upon his return to the industry, however,
the plaintiff discovered that his old union had been replaced by
the rival Seafarer's International Union (SIU), and he thus had
lost all seniority and was unable to ship out. Mr. Shishido eventually was able to secure employment on-board ship in 1960, and he
served continuously until 1976, at which time he applied for a disa79
bility pension.
Because of his inability to serve on-board ship between 1951 and
1956, and the loss of seniority due to the change of unions, the
defendant Pension Plan trustees determined that Mr. Shishido
had insufficient years of service under the Plan to qualify for the
full disability retirement pension.8 0 He sued under ERISA, claiming that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court
agreed on the basis that the pension plan itself allowed the trustees to waive the qualification rules for "good cause".8 1 In so doing,
the court observed that
[i]t is manifest that the drafters of the [plan] recognized that there could be
extraordinary circumstances which would warrant extension of the Qualification Period . . . . It would be inconsistent, illogical, and indeed, incredible to find that plaintiff's incapacity to obtain covered employment during
75. 587 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
76. Id. at 115.
77.

Id. The revocation of seamen's licenses for this reason was known as "screening".

78.

Id.

Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 116.
81. Id. at 119.

1985

ERISA

1053

the six years he was unlawfully screened because of unconstitutional government action does not fulfill the "other good cause" provision [of the
plan].
Therefore, this court finds that the Trustees' failure to modify the Qualification Period to accomodate plaintiff's extraordinary situation was arbitrary, capricious, and in violation of the strict fiduciary standards imposed
on pension plan trustees by ERISA and the LMRA."2

Although the decision in Shishido is not couched in terms of
fairness, it is evident from the foregoing rationale that fairness is
its underlying motivation."3 Other decisions, while acknowledging
trustees' discretionary authority, have not hesitated to invoke notions of fairness when reviewing their determinations: "the flexibility allowed to pension fund trustees is limited by principles of fundamental fairness. However reasonable the rules may appear on
their face, trustees cannot be allowed to apply them in an arbitrary
and capricious manner ....-18This fairness standard has found
acceptance by courts asked to review the application of new eligibility requirements under an existing pension plan.85 The Second
Circuit in Valie v. Joint Plumbing Industry Board articulated the
accepted standard for determining fairness:
In determining whether the particular application of a new eligibility requirement [is] arbitrary and capricious, a number of factors should be considered. They include the extent to which the applicant [is] an intended
beneficiary of the plan, the extent to which the amendment retroactively
strips the beneficiary of significant service credit, the extent to which the
trustees have notified the employee of these and other changes in rules, and
the extent to which there is actuarial justification for denying benefits in

82. Id. See also Harris v. Joint Plumbing Indus. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1284, 1289-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("as to this plaintiff-who demonstrated his loyalty to his craft and union
over an extended period of time, exceeded by almost double the contribution requirements
....and then was involuntarily prevented from complying with the final [eligibility] requirement, of which he had no prior notice, . . . the rules were arbitrarily applied").
83. See also Helms v. Monsanto Co., Inc., 728 F.2d 1416, 1420 (11th Cir. 1984) (trustee's interpretation of total disability under pension plan as requiring individual to be devoid of "conscious life" unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious).
84. Valle v. Joint Plumbing Indus. Bd., 623 F.2d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 1980) (case decided
under § 302(c)(5) of the LMRA).
85. See, e.g., Valle, 623 F.2d at 203-04; Agro v. Joint Plumbing Indus. Bd., 623 F.2d
207, 210 (2d Cir. 1980) (court's decision based on "fundamental equitable aspects of the
relationship between a pension fund trustee and the participants for whose benefit the fund
is administered"); New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund v.
Hoh, 561 F. Supp. 679, 684 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing Valle); Michota v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
526 F. Supp. 299, 312 n.17 (D.N.J. 1980) (citing Valle and Agro); Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Mo. 1979). See also Burroughs v. Board of Trustees of the
Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers, 542 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1976).

1054

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:1033

the particular case.86

The trustees, although possessing the power to amend the provisions of a pension plan, must do so in a way calculated to achieve
legitimate ends; the standard is, at its core, a requirement that the
trustees have a rational basis for taking any action which affects
the rights of pension plan participants under an existing plan.
The fairness standard necessitates a reasoned exercise of discretion. Where the discretion granted trustees is broad, it must be
exercised where appropriate to alleviate harsh or unjust results.
Where discretionary acts have the effect of depriving current plan
participants of expected benefits, fairness requires that notice be
given and that legitimate reasons for the action be articulated.
D.

Unanticipated Costs

"Attempts to prevent unanticipated costs that may limit the resources of an employee benefit plan are among the proper concerns
of a plan's administrator. ' 8 7 Such attempts, if they in fact are reasonably calculated to preserve the assets of a plan, have been ac88
cepted as a defense to charges of arbitrary and capricious action.
Because the trustees owe a fiduciary duty to those who have already retired as well as to those who will retire, decisions which
could affect the viability of the fund are not to be made lightly,
and the courts are hesitant to interfere.8 9 The majority of decisions
86. 623 F.2d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Mitzner v. Jarcho, 44 N.Y.2d 39, 46-47, 403
N.Y.S.2d 490, 494, 374 N.E.2d 388, 391-92 (1978)).
87. Griffis v. Delta Family-Care Disability & Survivorship Plan, 723 F.2d 822, 825
(11th Cir. 1984).
88. But see Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 154 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (government corporation which administers insolvent plans violated ERISA when it
reduced benefits under its regulations without "actually weighing" cost cutting
considerations).
89. See, e.g., Valle v. Joint Plumbing Indus. Bd., 623 F.2d 196, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1980):
The administration of a pension trust fund is not an easy task. In addition to accepting responsibility for the care of many millions of dollars of trust assets, the
trustees must carefully balance the interests of beneficiaries already retired against
those of beneficiaries who are about to retire and participants who will apply for
pensions in the more distant future. These interests sometimes appear irreconciliable,
particularly in view of the vagaries of the country's economy, including possible recession, rampant inflation and fluctuations in the fortunes of the particular trade. The
economic variables have caused many trustees, including the defendants here, concern that the stability of a pension fund, and hence the ability of the trustees to fulfill
* fiduciary duties to active members, may be seriously undermined by awards of benefits to beneficiaries who contribute small amounts of money to the fund during the
early years of their careers and then leave the trade, only to retire decades later and
obtain pension benefits that are disproportionate to their contributions.
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decided under this factor have concerned the propriety of the denial of an award of lump sum benefits from plans which authorize
them.90 This has not been the factor's exclusive application,9 1 however, and in appropriate circumstances it may prove
a useful de9
fense to charges of breach of fiduciary obligations. 2
E.

Violation of the Law

That the administration of a pension plan in violation of the law
would violate ERISA's fiduciary standards appears to be so selfevident as to require no discussion. Nevertheless, trustees have
erred in this regard. Perhaps the most egregious example is found
in Blau v. Del Monte Corp.,"3 where the trustees ran afoul of
ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements" by actively concealing the existence of a severance pay plan. Del Monte covered
certain of its employees with a written-but confidential-severance policy which provided for payment of benefits to
covered employees "whose positions are eliminated as a result of
reorganization, consolidation, or elimination of operations to which
they have been assigned and for whom appropriate alternative emId.
90. See, e.g., Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 680 F.2d 911, 915 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1983). See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Griffis v. Delta Family-Care Disability & Survivorship Plan, 723 F.2d
822, 824 (11th Cir. 1984) (trustees justified in refusing to re-enroll plaintiff in survivorship
pension plan after her remarriage, which disqualified her, was annulled); Paris v. Profit
Sharing Plan for Employees of Howard B. Wolf, Inc., 637 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir. 1981)
(trustees justified in refusing benefits under plan, which was retroactively effective, to employees who were terminated after plan's retroactively effective date but before plan was
officially adopted).
92. For example, many pension plans offer an early retirement option available upon
the request of the participant and the consent of the trustee. Faced with an increasing number of these requests, the trustees may be justified in refusing early retirement applications
on the basis of their deleterious effect on the pension fund, even where such requests were
before routinely granted. Cf. Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406
(4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2387 (1984). But see United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund v. McSkimming, No. 84-3542 (3d Cir. April 11, 1985), where the court
reversed the granting of summary judgment in favor of a plan participant in an action to
vacate an arbitration award because the award did not draw "its essence" from the plan.
Slip op. at 5. The court left undisturbed the arbitrator's finding that U.S. Steel's retention
of discretion to approve applications for pensions rendered it a fiduciary under ERISA, and
also did not comment upon the arbitrator's conclusion that the necessity for U.S. Steel to
consent to the granting of the pension "was facially invalid under ERISA." Id. at 4. The
court held only that "[b]ecause the arbitrator's award is patently based on statutory interpretation rather than on the Plan, the district court erred in refusing to vacate it." Id. at 6.
93. 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984).
94. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031. These requirements provide generally that the details of
any employee benefit plan be furnished to every participant. Id. § 1024(b).

1056

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:1033

ployment opportunities are unavailable in the Corporation."95 In
1980, Del Monte sold the division at which plaintiffs were employed to a group of private investors; plaintiffs were reemployed
by the new owner, but were not offered appropriate alternative employment with Del Monte.9 6 After learning of the existence of the
severance plan, the plaintiffs demanded payment. When. Del
Monte did not respond to the demand, plaintiffs sued under
ERISA. The district court inexplicably granted summary judgment
in favor of Del Monte, but the Ninth Circuit, in a vitriolic opinion,
reversed. 7
After first observing that it had "made no attempt to comply
with any of the duties that ERISA places upon a benefit plan administrator,"9 8 the court leveled the following broadside at Del
Monte:
The administrator of an employee welfare benefit plan, such as this severance benefit policy, has no discretion to secrete the plan, to flout the reporting, disclosure and fiduciary obligations imposed by ERISA, or to deny benefits in contravention of the plan's plain terms ....

Del Monte's decision

to deny benefits in this case was part and parcel of its flagrant violation of
ERISA's reporting, disclosure and fiduciary standards. Its denial also contradicted the provision of benefits for which the plan's plain termsstripped of any secret analysis of the plan's secreted terms-provide. Thus,
the defendant's decision was, at best, arbitrary and capricious. 9

The court then announced a standard which is certain to find universal acceptance if only limited application: "continued arbitrary
and capricious administration [of a plan] . . . is highly probative
of whether a particular decision to deny benefits was infected by
its having been made in conformity with the objectionable
scheme." 10 0
Other less egregious violations of the statute have also been
found to be contrary to ERISA's fiduciary standards. 10 1 Fiduciaries
must insure that their administration of a plan comports with both
95. 748 F.2d at 1350.
96. Id. at 1351.
97. Id. at 1351-53.
98. Id. at 1352.
99. Id. at 1353 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 1354.
101. See, e.g., Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 155 (D.C. Cir.

1984) (PBGC interpretation of ERISA which does not comport with "the preponderance of
the evidence of specific congressional intent" is unreasonable); Russell v. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1983) (failure of fiduciary to render a decision
on a claim within time period prescribed in federal regulations is a breach of fiduciary duty),
cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984), argued, April 24, 1985.
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the letter and spirit of ERISA.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite its confused origins, the arbitrary and capricious standard is that under which trustees of employee pension and benefit
plans must labor. The standard is not distinguished by its ease of
application. Although it does allow for the exercise of reasoned discretion by trustees, such trustees must be aware that the courts
view participation in an employee benefit or pension plan as an
individual property right that is not to be treated summarily. Adding to the difficulty is the possibility that individuals may not be
aware of their fiduciary responsibilities until advised thereof by the
courts 10 2 and that decisions which seem reasonable as "good business practice" may not meet the fiduciary standards which those
10 3
same courts impose long after the decision has been made.
ERISA pension and benefit plans are the largest aggregate
source of private capital in the world. 1' 0 Many have been accumulated by business organizations now threatened by emerging "third
world" economies, new technologies, changing consumer preferences and, often, by their own failure to react appropriately to
these challenges. Innovative attempts to access ERISA-protected
funds for general business purposes (sometimes characterized as
''rescue missions" necessary to avoid bankruptcy) are frequently
reported. These attempts should insure that the courts have not
yet finished with their definition of the standards governing the
actions of ERISA fiduciaries.
John A. McCreary, Jr.

102. See supra notes 24-50 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1069 (1982) (trustees of pension plan, who were also corporate officers, violated ERISA by
causing plan to purchase shares of corporate stock at inflated prices in effort to thwart hostile tender offer).
104. See supra note 2.

